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Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being conducted
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and as such
receive only limited scientific review. Views or opinions contained
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of the
National Member Organizations supporting the Institute.

Preface
As stated in its charter, IIASA shall initiate
and support research in relation to problems of modern
societies arising from scientific and technological
development. According to the aspirations of the
founders of IIASA and the National f1ember Organizations
(NMO) , IIASA is expected to focus on real problems of
interest to our NMOs and to be in regular contact with
decision and policy makers in order to get a better
understanding about the problems faced by them and to
try to provide them with guidance or help for decision
making.
In an attempt to be better prepared to meet the
expectations of its NMOs, IIASA has intensified its
interactions with policy or decision ｾ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ ｳ Ｎ This
research paper is an attem?t to describe and improve
the tools for jecisiGn making in order to facilitate
the interaction between the decision maker and his
scientific advisers.
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Abstract
Policy makers do not benefit from advances in
a) systems analysis or b) judgment and decision
theory because neither of these disciplines recog-
nize the incompleteness of its methodology. A complete
methodology requires a synthesis of the two. This
Research Memorandum explains why such a synthesis is
necessary, describes how it can be achieved, and provides
a worked-out example of its application to the problem of
changing sources of energy production in the US. The
example also illustrates that the linkage of systems
analysis and judgment theory provides information that
neither discipline can provide separately. ｾ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ Ｌ the
Research Memorandum shows that such information is policy-
relevant and that it provides more effective assistance
to the policy maker than does either approach used sepa-
rately.
The authors thank James Curry and Anton Toifelhardt
for their assistance in carrying out this study. We are
indebted to Edward S. Quade and Jeryl Mumpower for their
advice and criticjsm in the preparation of the re?ort.
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How Systems Analysts Can Provide More Effective
Assistance to the Policy Maker
.. both organism and environment will have to be
as systems, each with properties of its own. .. II
Egan Brunswik
(1900-1955)
seen
The uncertain interdependence of large numbers of difficult-to-
measure variables in the socia-physical systems of the world places
extraordi nary demands on the cognitive capaciti es of pol icy makers. Indeed,
more and more people are cnming to believe that expanding and cOflfusing
interdependence within and among such problems as energy development and
use, food distribution, and population growth has already put solutions
beyond the capacity of human problem-solving abilities. The pressing need
f0r solutions to these and similar problems, and the decreasing optimism
regarding the likelihood of find';ng solutions, is reflected in the virtu-
ally continuous series of scientific symposia and intergovernmental
meetings directed toward coping with these problems.
Two groups of researchers, whom we shall identify roughly as
systems analysts and judgment analysts, have decided that the solutions
to these problems are indeed beyond the unaided cognitive capacities of
mankind. As a result, they have directed their efforts toward providing
decision aids for policy makers [lJ. Despite the rapid production of a
large scientific literature supporting their contention that scientific-
ally respectable and practically useful decision aids can now be provided
for policy makers [2J [3J, neither group has been conspicuously successful
2in convincing POl icy makers that decision aids are useful. Indeed, success
stories of the practical benefits of either research group are so few, and
complaints about the failure of both types of models are so common, that a
well-known systems analyst (Watt) has written a guest editorial for
Simulation plaintively entitled, "Why won't anyone believe US?II [4J.
We believe that this situation should be, and can be, remedied.
Since both groups of researchers have developed decision aids that policy
makers can use now to their considerable advantage, and to the advantage
of those who must live with the policies that policy makers produce, they
should be used. The purpose of this Research Memorandum, therefore, is,
first, to provide a diagnosis of the present situation, tllat is, to indi-
cate why policy makers have not widely accepted the value of systems
analysis or judgment and decision analysis, second, to describe a remedy
for this situation. and third. to provide an example of the remedy that
is advocated here.
Diagnosis
The main reason for the lack of success of both groups is that the
methodology employed by each group is incomplete. Incompleteness is due
to:
1. systems analysts devoting themselves to the development of
analytical models of external systems. that is, systems that exist outside
of persons (for example, energy systems, ecological systems, etc.) while
ignoring (or treating amateurishly) internal systems, that is, systems
that exist within persons (for example, the cognitive systems of the users
of such models) and
32. judgment and decision analysts devoting themselves to devel-
oping analytical models of internal (cognitive) systems, while ignoring
(or treating amateurishly) the external systerr6 to which such cognitive
systems are to be appl ied.
Unfortunately, the gulf between these two groups of researchers is
wide; neither group has acknowledged the potential contribution of the
other. Systems analysts who study external systems ignore the potential
contribution to policy formation of those who study internal systems.
Those who study i nterna1 systems ignore the potential contri but i on of those
who study external systems. Indeed, each group isla rge ly ignorant (and
when not ignorant, often skeptical) of the work done by the other group.
External-systems analysts, for example are usually ignorant of the fact
that internal-systems analysts construct and test under controlled condi-
tions quantitative models of judgment and decision processes (an opportunity
seldom available to external-systems analysts). Many external-systems
analysts will be surprised to learn that the same general approach they
use (linking input conditions to output conditions by means of quantitative
expressions) is also used by researchers (mainly psychologists) who create
and test models of internal cognitive systems.
Even when external-systems analysts do learn (almost invariably by
personal contact, not by reading the literature) that scientific work of
this kind has been going on for 20 to 30 years, they greet the idea of
internal-systems analysis with unhealthy skepticism and adopt a do-it-
yourself approach. Consequently, external-systems analysts frequently
become amateur psychologists and re-invent explanations of human behavior
long ago tested and abandoned as false--hardly a desirable circumstance,
4for either the ｳ ｾ ［ ･ ｮ ｴ ［ ｦ ｩ ｣ or policy making communities. Instances of this
sort may be seen in the naive faith exhibited by external-systems analysts
when they assume that the policy maker is capable of coping with the
information produced by models of external systems. Largely ignorant of
all the work that has been done on information processing,external-systems
｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｴ ｾ are apt to believe that all that is required in order to persuade
the policy maker to use the results of their work is "better communication,"
meaning more and better graphs and evermore simplified explanations.
The incomplete methodology of internal-systems analysts provides a
mirror-image of the incompleteness of the methodology of the external-
systems analysts. The internal-systems analysts ordinarily know almost
nothing about the techniques employed by external-systems analysts. And
when internal-systems analysts do learn (usually from personal contact,
not by reading the literature) about the work of their counterparts, they
are apt to greet the idea of external-systems analysis with skepticism.
Indeed, knowledge of the fact that their (internal) models can be tested
empirically under controlled conditions, whereas external models generally
cannot, is apt to lead internal-systems analysts to take a holier-than-
thou attitude toward the external-systems analyst. On the other hand,
since many, if not most, external-systems analysts are trained in mathe-
matics and physical sciences, they are apt to take a holier-than-thou
attitude to \vhat they mistakenly consider to be a IIsoft" approach to an
insurmountable problem. "Don't try to quantify the unquantifiable" is
the advice an internal-systems analyst often hears from his counterpart.
And just as external-systems analysts become amateur psychologists
as a result of ignoring scientific psychology, internal-systems analysts
5become amateur external-systems analysts. Internal-systems analysts must
use representations of the outside world, that is, external systems, in
their research, but in order to make their research task more manageable,
internal-systems analysts use such oversimplified representations of the
outside world, mainly because they ignore the uncertain interdependencies
among variables, that the results of their work are often irrelevant to
the problem of policy formation.
One of the worst results of the guif between the two groups of
systems analysts is that no formal means have been developed to integrate
the information each type of systems analyst provides. Without a formal
mechanism for integrating this information, the policy maker must--somehow--
integrate that information himself. To GO that he must use his cognitive
abilities as well as he can to integrate information developed by researchers
working independently of one another, and with little regard for the com-
patibility of the data produced by each group. As will be shown in detail
below, achieving such a linkage is difficult enough even when plans for
matching the data have been made in advance; attempting to integrate incom-
patible data by intuitive means after the fact is a hopeless task.
How can this patently undesirable state of affairs be remedied?
Remedy and Example
Both groups of systems analysts should realize that their activi-
ties are complementary, and they should develop research teams that build
on their complementary efforts. More specifically, a complete methodology
should be developed to replace the incomplete methodologies used at present.
Our example illustrates both points. We proceed by
6°first, what the task of the internal-systems analyst is,
°second, what the task of the external-systems analyst is,
°third, what the task of the policy consultant is.
The latter role is a new one; the task for the policy consultant
is to link, analytically (not intuitively), the information produced by
both types of systems analysts, and thus to display the integrated informa-
tion to the policy maker in a manner that allows him to interact with it
in a controlled, explicit manner. Unless this function is deliberately
and specifically assigned to someone knowledgeable in both areas of systems
analysis, or to a te:am made up of both types of systems analysts (as in
the present stuqy), the policy maker will be left to his own efforts to
integrate this information. And because he usually ｾ left to his own
resources, it is hardly surprising to find that policy makers do not
attempt that which is unfamiliar and difficult, but return to what is
familiar and ･｡ｳｾＧＬ namely, doing what they have always done. In short,
it is not a question of policy makers not I/believing" systems analysts,
as Watt would have it, but a matter of policy makers being incapable of
coping with the information provided by systems analysts of either type.
Better graphs and simpler illustrations will not help policy makers inte-
grate information.
Linking the information produced by both types of systems analysts
is a task that neither group can afford to ignore. For unless the linkage
is carried out by scientific/technical means, and in a professionally
responsible way, the efforts of the systems analysts and the policy makers
will be less than adequate, if not altogether wasted.
7In order to make clear the remedy we advocate, we present the
logic of the method in the context of an example. Three hypothetical
policy makers with different (internal) social value systems were created
to use the information provided by a complex (external) model (COAL 1) of
the U. S. energy demand system. COAL 1 was constructed by Roger Naill at
Dartmouth and is similar in its general form to the Meadows-Forrester type
of world model [5J. Hypothetical, rather than real, policy makers were
employed in order to simplify the example; COAL 1 was used because it is
a highly complex external model, and thus illustrates the point that the
method is not restricted to the simpler model used in the first linkage
of external and internal models [6J.
The tasks of the internal-systems analyst, the external-systems
analyst, and the policy consultant are described in relation to the problem
of deciding which interventions should be made in the U. S. socio-physica1
system in order to avoid or reduce aversive conditions regarding sources
of energy in the U. S.
The Task for the Internal-Systems Analyst
The primary task for the internal-systems analyst is to discover
and to externalize the policy maker's judgment policy with regard to the
future conditions he wishes to achieve and the present interventions by
which he would like to achieve them. Each of the terms emphasized above
is described below.
1. Externalize: This term indicates that the internal-systems
analyst attempts to derive an explicit, quantitative description of the
policy maker's cognitive system by which he integrates information into
8a judgment of prt::ference. Thus, what was formerly an internal (and thus
mysterious), i mpl i cit, covert cogniti ve system, becomes an external overt
system described in quantitative terms.
2. Policy: This term refers to the parameters of the quantitative
expression that describes the policy maker's judgment system. Such param-
eters include weights, the forms of the functional relations between each
policy variable and the policy maker's judgment of preference, as well as
the method of aggregating information regarding these variables, and the
consistency with which the judgments are made. In the present case, each
policy maker's judgment policy will be described by means of an (internal)
mathematical model of the form
J = wlxl + w2x2 + ..• wnXn
in which the XIS refer to the variables in a given policy and the w's refer
to the weight or relative importance of each variable. (Note: internal
models need not be restricted to the weighted sum expression indicated
here; ｦ ｾ ｲ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ information regarding such models may be found in [7].)
3. Future conditions: Nearly all models of external systems are
time-dependent contingency models. That is, they provide "what if.. II
information regarding the future conditions that will result from various
actions that might be taken in the present. It is the internal-systems
analyst's task to externalize the policy maker's judgment policy with
regard to the future conditions he wishes to achieve. It is essential to
note that it is not sufficient merely to know which specific conditions
the policy maker wishes to achieve; the policy maker's judgment policy
regarding all relevant future conditions must be determined. It is as
necessary to have a quantitative model of the policy maker's (internal)
9judgment policy regarding future conditions as it is to have a quantitative
model of the (external) mechanisms that produce those future conditions.
For it is a judgment policy that will evaluate any set of future conditions.
Unless that judgment policy is known and described in quantitative form,
its parameters and functions will remain elusive; and, therefore, one
critical aspect of the policy formation process will remain unknown.
4. Present interventions: Just as it is the internal-systems
analyst1s task to develop a quantitative model of the policy maker's judg-
ment policy regarding future conqitions, it is also the internal-systems
analyst's task to develop a quantitative model of the policy maker's judg-
ment policy regarding present interventions--those actions the policy
maker might wish to take in order to bring about specific future conditions.
And, as in the above case, it is essential to note that it is not sufficient
merely to know which specific interventions the policy maker wishes to
employ; a quantitative model of the policy maker's judgment policy (as
defined above) regarding interventions must be constructed. For without
such a model the ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ｯ ｮ ｳ for the policy maker's preference judgments for
any specific set of interventions would remain unknown, and thus a second
aspect of the policy formation process would remain unknown.
To summarize: it is the task of the internal-systems analyst to
construct a model of the policy maker1s judgment processes regarding future
conditions and present interventions. The construction of such cognitive
models provides general quantitative expressions that permit the internal-
systems analyst to predict the preference judgments of a policy maker in
response to a number of real or hypothetical future conditions and the
interventions that produce them. Moreover, internal models provide systems
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analysts, policy consultants and policy makers with the opportunity to
observe the variables and parameters that control the policy maker's evalua-
tion of any specific set of future conditions or present interventions, and
the opportunity to change these if it is desired to do so. (For further
information regarding these steps, the reader may consult [8], [9].)
Having indicated the general aims of the internal-systems analyst
we turn now to a description of the steps employed to achieve those aims.
Step 1. Discover the General Policy of the Policy
Maker Regarding Future Conditions
There are a variety of means by which future conditions may be
achieved. and, of course, different policy makers will have different
preferences for different means to achieve them. Such differences in
preferences are the product of a general policy. But, as is customary in
external model building, neither preferences for various means, nor the
policy that produces them were explored by Naill in his development of
COAL 1. In order to pursue our example here, however, we ｾｨ｡ｬＱ assume
that all three of our hypothetical policy makers named the same unidimen-
sianal, bi-polar means for producing energy, namely those used in the
construction of COAL 1. These include differential dependence on:
1. Conventional oil and gas supplies;
2. Synthetic oil and gas supplies;
3. Importation of oil and gas;
4. Nuclear fueled power;
5. Coal fueled power.
Although we assumed that all three hypothetical policy makers
would name the same means for providing energy, we allowed them to differ
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in the extent to which they prefer to depend upon them. Thus, for example,
one policy maker may prefer a future set of conditions in which conven-
tional oil and gas, and coal, provide the major sources of power, whereas
a different policy maker may prefer a future in which synthetic oil and
gas are combined with nuclear fuel. It is the internal-systems analyst's
task to discover not only which specific sources of energy the policy
maker prefers to depend upon but the general policy he holds that produces
specific preferences. This procedure is described in detail below.
ｓｴ･ｰｾＮ Discover the Range of AcceDtab1e Conditions
A second task for the internal-systems analyst is to determine the
acceptab1 € range of the means to be emp 10.ved ter bri ng about des i rab le
future conditions. In the present example, therefore, it is necessary to
discover the extent to which dependence on each of the above energy sources
would be acceptable to the policy maker. Thus, the policy maker would be
required to indicate the acceptable limits (if any) placed on each fraction
of energy supplied by each source, say, 20% of energy supplied by conven-
tional oil and gas, 10% by synthetic oil and gas, etc. (The information
derived from this step will also be used by the external-systems analyst
when constructing the model of the energy system.) For purposes of the
present example, no limits were placed on the ranges of any of the above
sources of energy by th e hypotheti ca1 po 1icy makers.
Step 1. Di scover the Gene ra1 Pol icy of the Pol i cy
Maker Regarding the Interventions to ｢ ｾ Employed
This step requires the internal-systems analyst to determine which
interventions the policy maker considers to be socially desirable. The
question is: what means should be employed now to bring about desirable
12
future ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ Naill did not pursue the question of which variety or
IImix ll of several possible interventions would be chosen by any specific
policy maker, nor the question of the nature of the general policy that
controlled the choice of that variety of intervention. For the purposes
of our example, however, it will be sufficient if we ｡ｳｳｵｾｾ that all three
policy makers indicate that they wish to make identical policy interven-
tions, namely, those Naill chose to use in COAL 1. These include:
1. Controlling the rate of energy growth;
2. Controlling the time of deregulation of oil and gas prices;
3. Controlling the extent of conservation measures (use of
insulation, production of smaller cars, etc.);
4. Controlling the rate of development of nuclear power;
5. Controlling the rate of development of coal resources.
Variations in the level of each of these variables lead to various
II packages I; of pol i cy i ntervent ions.
Step i. Discover ｴｨｾ Range of Acceptability for
Each of the Policy Interventions
It is essential that ranges of acceptable policy interventions be
specified if a meaningful use of the model is to be achieved. Otherwise
the choice of a given level of intervention is arbitrary. (As in the case
of establishing ranges on the variables in the subsequent conditions policy,
the infonnation derived from this step will also be used by the external-
systems analyst when constructing the model of the energy system.) For the
purpose of the present example we arbitrarily assigned ranges to each of
the following variables: (a) energy growth in 1985, (b) year of deregula-
tion of oil and gas prices, (c) conservation measures, (d) nuclear
13
development t (e) coal development. The specific ranges and descriptions
of these interventions are described below (pp. 25-32).
To summarize: the first task for the internal-systems analyst is
to assist the policy maker in identifying (a) the general policy controlling
the specification of the future conditions the policy maker wishes to
achieve, (b) the general policy controlling the specification of the inter-
ventions that are intended to produce these conditions t and (c) the range
of acceptable variations on the variables within each general policy.
Once the variables (and their acceptable ranges) within these policies are
established, variations within these ranges will provide a number of
specific future conditions as well as a variety of specific interventions.
Thus, for example, one variation of future conditions would include (a)
large dependence on conventional oil and gas supplies, (b) moderate depend-
ence on imported fuels, (d) low dependence on nuclear fueled power, and
(e) low dependence on coal fueled power. Each such variation, of which
there will be many, constitutes a Subsequent Conditions Package (SCP).
Each SCP thus constitutes a specific set of outcomes or future conditions
that fall within the policy maker's policy regarding the future.
The same is true for interventions that are employed to bring about
subsequent conditions. Once the variables (and their acceptable ranges)
within the intervention policy are established, variations within these
ranges will provide a number of specific interventions that can be evalu-
ated by the policy maker. Thus, for example, one policy intervention would
include (a) low energy growth in 1985, (b) delay in the deregulation of
oil and gas prices, (c) a large effort with regard to conservation, (d) a
large effort with regard to nuclear development and (e) a small effort with
14
regard to coal ､ｾｶ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｴＮ As in the case of subsequent conditions, each
variati0n constitutes a Policy Intervention Package (PIP), and each PIP
thus cons titutes a specifi c II package ll of interventions that fall withi n
the policy maker's general policy concerning IIwhat-to-do-now. 1I
ｓｴ･ｰｾＮ Generating ｾ Vari ety of SCPs and PI Ps
In this step a nunber (N) of SCPs and PIPs are randomly generated
in order to provide a sample of outcomes and interventions. (The size of
N will be determined by time, resources, and the nature of the problem.)
Generating randomly N cases of interventions and outcomes insures that no
set of subsequent conditions or policy interventions will be omitted by
implicit bias, and provides a base from which inferences may be explicitly
and legitimately drawn. (Scenario writing, in which few, usually no more
than three, cases are evaluated, fails to meet either criterion.) Cases
may be presented on a computer terminal by means of POLICY 3 [8], [9], or
by means of a series of charts.
Step §.. The fol icy Maker ｾｸ･ｲ｣ｩｳ･ｳ l1i s Judgment
The policy maker exercises his judgment with regard to each SCP
and each PIP in terms of a rating scale (Figures 1 and 2) and thus indi-
cates his preference for each PIP and SCPo
Step I. Th e Interna l-Sys terns Ana lys t Mode1s the
Policy ｾ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｇ ｳ Policy.
The policy maker's judgments are now analyzed in terms of a quanti-
tative model. In the present case, a weighted average regression model
was used [7]. The policy makers' Subsequent Conditions Policies were
quantified in the form indicated below:
15
CASE 1
Conventional oil & Gas
Synthetic Oil & Ga3
Oil & Gas Imports
Nuclear Po'ver
Coal Development
Evaluation? 17
CASE 2
Conventional oil & Gas
Synthetic Oil & Gas
Oil & Gas Imports
Nuclear Power
Coal Development
Evaluation? 13
CASE 3
Conventional Oil & Gas
Synthetic Oil & Gas
Oil & Gas Imports
ｾ ｾ ｵ ｣ lear Power
Coal Development
Evaluation? 9
29.859
0.197
33.953
3.091
25.790
21.958
0.028
41.581
2.901
24.380
27.681
0.025
41.582
3.652
23.760
Figure 1. Examples of Subsequent Conditions Packages (SCPs) displayed
for the policy maker by the POLICY 3 program. Each package is
evaluated on a 20-point rating scale.
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CASE 1
Energy Growth
Dereg. Oil & Gas (Year)
Conservation
Nuclear Development
Coal Development
Evaluation? 9
CASE 2
Energy Growth
Dereg. Oil & Gas (Year)
Conservation
ｾ ｵ ｣ ｬ ･ ｡ ｲ Development
Coal Development
Evaluation? 16
CASE 3
Energy Growth
Dereg. Oil & Gas (Year)
Conservation
Nuclear Development
Coal Development
Evaluation? 7
2.300
1978
25
8
9
1.700
1982
28
8
7
2.300
1979
18
7
2
Figure 2. Examples of Policy Intervention Packages (PIPs) displayed
by the POLICY 3 program.
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J = wl(x l ) + w2(x2). ... ,wi (xi )' or
J = w1(conventiona1 oil and gas) + w2(synthetic oil and gas) + w3(oil and
gas imports) + w4(nuc1ear power) + wS(coal).
The same step is taken with regard to PIPs. The sample of PIPs is
presented to the policy maker, he rates their desirability, and his judg-
ment policy regarding interventions is thus obtained and represented in
the form below:
J = wl(energy growth) + w2(deregu1ation of oil and gas prices
(year)) + w3(conservation) + w4(nuclear development) + w5(coa1 development).
In both cases, the policy maker's judgment policy is displayed for
him immediately, if a computer terminal is used. The policy maker may
thus observe (a) the weights that he applies to each single intervention
aspect (e.g., the weight given to rate of energy growth, to deregulation
of oil and gas, etc.), (b) the function form relating each aspect of inter-
vention to this rating, and (c) the consistency "lith which he exercised
his judgment concerning PIPs and SCPs (see Figures 3 and 4). In addition,
the policy maker may change any of these properties of his judgment policy
and/or compare them with other policies. (See [lOJ for an example of
the use of the above method in policy making circumstances.)
The intervention policies from two hypothetical policy makers are
displayed in Figure 5, together with our estimates of what President
Carter's intervention policy was at the time he announced it (based on
information printed in the International Herald Tribune, 20 Apri 1 1977;
the official description of Carter's energy policy, published 29 April
1977, is roughly in accord with the newspaper account [llJ). As may be
seen in Figure 5, hypothetical Jl emphasizes (given greatest weight to)
18
POLICY 'Evaluation' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 0.93
RELATIVE WEIGHT PROFILE
A:Evaluation
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
Ener.gy Growth
AAAAAAAAA
Dereg. Oil & Gas (Year.)
AAA
Conservation
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Nuclear Development
AAAAl'\AAAAAAA
Coal Development
A
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
WEIGHT FUNCT FORM
0.23 NEGLIN
0.09 NONLIN
0.36 POSLIN
ｾｪ • 28 NONLIN
0.04 POSLIN
Figure 3. A display showing the relative importance of each of the factors
in the Policy Intervention Packages to a hypothetical policy maker. The
consistency, or predictability, of the policy maker's judgments with respect
to the model of the judgments is also shown in the display. (The maximum
va1ue is 1.00.)
19
MAX = 20.00
AAAAAA * A
AA AA * AA
A * A
A * AA
A * A
A * AA
A * A
A * AA
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
*A
*******************
*A
*******************
1.000
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* A
* A
*
FUNCTION ｆｏｒｾ PROFILE
ａ Ｚ ｅ ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｚ ｾ ｉ ｎ =
E*A
v* AA
a* A
1* AA
u* A
a* AA
t* A
i* AA
0* A
n* AA
* A
* AA
* A
*******************
1.6 3.5
Energy Growth
1976.0 1984.0
Dereg. Oil & Gas-Year
15.0 32.0
Conservation
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
* A
* AA
*A
*******************
A
A
A
AAAAA
A AA
A A
A A
E*
v*
a*
1*
u* A
a*A
t.*
i*
0*
n*
*
*
* A
*******************
5.0 10.0
Nuclear Deve10pffient
1.0 10.0
Coal Development
Figure 4. Functional relationships between each factor in the Policy
Intervention Packages and the policy makerls judgments.
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POLICY 'J1' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
POLICY 'J2' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
POLICY 'Carter' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
RELATIVE WEIGHT PROFILE
A:Jl
B:J2
C:Carter
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
Energy Growth
AAAA
BBB
ceceecce
Dereg. Oil & Gas (Year)
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
BBB
cec
Conservation
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
BBB
ceccccceccccc
Nuclear Development
A
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
CCC
Coal Development
A
BBB
CCCCCCCCCCCCC
ＰＮＱＲｉＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＮＵＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＱＮＰ
WEIGHT FUNCT FORM
121.10 POSLIN
0.1121 POSLIN
0.20 NEG LIN
0.40 POSLIN
121.10 POSLIN
121.10 POSLIN
0.40 POSLIN
121.10 POSLIN
'''3121 POSLIN
121.05 POSLIN
0.60 POSLIN
12I .1121 POSLIN
121.05 POSLIN
121.10 POSLIN
121.30 POSLIN
Figure 5. Descriptions of hypothetical intervention policies for two
hypothetical polic.Y makers (Jl & J2) and "President Carter." The specified
policies have perfect consistency. Functional relationships were assumed
to be linear and are not shown.
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deregulation and conservation, J2 emphasizes nuclear power development,
whereas II Pres i dent Carter" emphasi zes i ncreas i ng conse rvati on and coal
development while emphasizing decreasing energy growth. (For simplicity
of exposition ir the present case, all function forms were assumed to be
linear over the ranges employed, and the policy makers were assumed to be
perfectly consistent. In practice, no difficulties are created when these
assumptions are not met.) These policies show in explicit form how the
policy maker will evaluate any proposal for intervention that he hopes
will achieve those subsequent conditions he considers to be desirable.
The policies that are applied to the evaluation of future condi-
tions are shown in Figure 6. Jl emphasizes coal development, J2 emphasizes
conventional oil and gas, while emphasizing negatively oil and gas imports,
and nuclear power. IIPresident Carter" emphasizes positively coal develop-
ment while emphasizing negatively oil and gas imports.
It is important to note that the quantitative description of these
judgment policies makes the judgment process explicit and widely under-
standable; the quantitative character of the externalized judgment policy
reduces dependence on the ambiguity of words, and reduces the effect of
language differences as well (just as the quantitative character of external
models reduces their dependence on the ambiguity of words and language
di fferences).
To summarize: these steps make it possible to show the policy
maker the judgment policy he used to evaluate the SCPs and PIPs in terms
of (a) the weight applied to various aspects of the SCPs and PIPs, (b) the
functional relation between each aspect and his judgment, and (c) the
consistency of his judgment. The policy maker may, of course, change
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POLICY 'Jl' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
POLICY 'J2' HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
POLICY Ｇ ｃ ｡ ｾ ｴ ･ ｾ Ｇ HAS A PREDICTABILITY OF 1.00
RELATIVE WFIGHT PROFILE
A:Jl
B:J2
C:Carter
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
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BB
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AAAAA
BBBBBBBBBBBBB
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
Nuclear Power
AAAAA
BBBBBBBB
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Figure 6. A display showing the Subsequent Conditions judgment policies
of the three policy makers.
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these as he sees fit (a step achieved quickly if POLICY 3 is used). The
result achieved by this procedure is that an expl icit, quantitative model
of a policy for evaluating outcomes and interventions is now available for
inspection, and ｦｾｲ application to specific proposals for interventions
and the subsequent outcomes produced by them. We turn now to the modeling
of the processes that intervene between policy interventions and subse-
quent conditions, in other words, to the task of the external-systems
ana lys t.
The Task for the External-Systems Ana lys t
The external-system5 analyst must first develop a model of the
external system. The model can then be run in order to determine the
subsequent conditions that would result from specific policy interventions.
Step 1. Develop ｾ Model of the External System
The first activity of the external-systems analyst is, therefore,
to develop a model of the external system that is under analysis. The
appropriate variables must be selected from within the system, and their
relations with each other must be defined.
As indicated earlier, a previously developed model, Naill IS [5J
COAL 1, was selected for purposes of the present demonstration. COAL 1
is a systems dynamic model of energy supply and demand of the United States.
Included within the model is an accounting of energy demand growth, resource
depletion, price effects, lead times, and financial and environmental con-
straints on the development of neyl energy resources. Figure 7 indicates
the basic structure of COAL 1. The model describes the U. S. energy
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Figure 7. CUALI MODEL STRUCTURE [5J
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system from 1950 till the present ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ and attempts to predict the future
of the system through 2010. It portrays an energy system that was in
balance in 1950 and has since deteriorated to the point where in 1976 the
U. S. is importing a significant portion of its energy inputs. If no
major changes in energy policies take place, the model, when run over a
time period of 1977 through 2010, indicates that the U. S. will import
more than 50% of its oil by 1990. This situation implies that the U. S.
will attempt to move from dependence on scarce oil and gas resuurces to
more abundant energy resources of solar radiation, coal and uranium over
the next 35 years. Figure 8 shows the U. S. energy transition problem as
projected by COAL 1 if no new U. S. policies are initiated; domestic oil
and gas production peaks and declines after 1970, and because of financial
and economic constraints and delays, neither coal nor nuclear power grow
quickly enough to avoid massive dependence on oil and gas imports during
the transition period.
ｓ ｴ ･ ｰ ｾ Ｎ Identify Types of Policy Interventions and
Specify Their Effects
As a consequence of these conditions, the issue now becomes: what
types of policy interventions will affect future reliance upon oil imports
by the U. S.? Policy interventions presently being considered and imple-
mented by the U. S. Government, and those indicated by President Carter in
his energy policy [llJ include (a) conservation measures, (b) reduced
growth in energy demand, and (c) an accelerated coal program. Table 1
illustrates additional policy interventions that are available to the
U. S. pol i cy maker and accounted for in the COAL 1 rriode 1.
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Table 1. COAL 1 Policy Options (5)
RESOURCE EXTRACTION
REFINING, TRANSPORTATION
SYNTHETIC CONVERSION
REFINING, TRANSPORTATION
ELECTRICITY CONVERSION,
TRANSPORTATION, DISTRIBUTION END-USE DEMAND
1. Nuclear fuel subsidies
2. Oil import quotas,
embargoes
3. Foreign oil tariffs
4. Enhanced oil or gas
recovery
5. Oil or gas price
deregulation
6. 1969 Coa 1 Mi ne Hea lth
& Safety Act
7. Ban on surface mining
8. Surface Mining Restrictions
a. Steep slope restrictions
b. Federal surface coal
reclamation standards
c. Surface-mined coal tax
9. Coal Investment Incentives
a. Loan guarantees
b. Coal price support
10. Accelerated R&D in:
In-situ oil shale
Low-BTU gas
High-BTU gas
Coal liquefaction
11. Accelerated commer-
cialization incen-
tives (price or
loan guarantees)
for:
Oil from shale
Low BTU-gas
High-BTU gas
Coal liquefaction
12. Utility rate relief 18. Conservation
policies
13. ｾｴｩｬｩｴｹ load management ("Technical Fix")
14. Reduction of nuclear 19. Zero Energy
siting &planning lead Growth
time
20. Intensive
15. Relaxation of S02 Electrification
standards
21. Accelerated coal
16. Accelerated development use in industry
and implementation of
coal combustion tech- N
nologies: '-J
Stack gas crubbers
Fluidized bed combustion
Solvent-refined coal
MHO
17. Nuclear Moratorium
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The fo11vwing illustrates how one of the policy interventions
(conservation) is implemented within COAL 1. Conservation implies such
efforts as providing better insulation in homes, use of heat pumps, and
smaller cars in order to reduce energy consumption. The Ford Foundation
energy study [12J indicated that net energy consumption could be reduced
by 28 percent by the year 2000 if maximum conservation measures were to
be employed. Assuming that the average energy price increases by a factor
of 2.7 by the year 2000 (the minimum price rise generated by COAL 1 to
the year 2000), conservation policies imply a price elasticity (etf) of:
1n .72
etf = ln 2.7 = -.33
If conservation policies ("technical fix") tend to increase the respon-
siveness of energy demand tc price, these policies may be modeled by
increasing the slope of DMP2T to correspond to an elasticity of -.33, as
shown in Figure 9.
The range of conservation given by Naill lies between the negative
slopes of .15 and .33. A negative .15 indicates a "business as usual"
environment whereas a negative .33 implies the maximum possible reduction
in energy consumption as given in the Ford Foundation energy study. A
necessary step in our endeavor was to derive the appropriate formulas to
operate between the minimum and maximum values, which had not been previ-
ously developed for COAL 1. Such formulas were necessary to allow the
policy makers the opportunity to operate within the previously calculated
ranges. The following is an illustration of the formula developed for
conservation:
DMP2T.. = e(-Aj . log Zi) . 1n10lJ
(1)
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Figure 9. Effects of Ford Foundation Conservation
"Technical Fix") Policies on the Demand Multipliers from
Price DMP Relationship (5)
30
where Aj is a set of slopes representing the elasticity of demand
with respect to price;
where Zi = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10
(Energy price/Energy price in 1970);
for i = 1,2, ... , I
where I is 11;
for j = 1,2, ..• ,J
where J is 24
(24 is the number of cases studied).
Similar formulas were developed for several policy interventions
available within COAL 1 for purposes of providing a wide ｴｾｮｧ･ of choices
within each intervention. Computer programs were developed for such
formulas and were utilized to create much of the required input data
necessary for the COAL 1 model runs.
Based upon those factors that are anticipated to be a part of the
U. S. energy policy, we selected five policy interventions for the present
example; these are presented in Table 2, together with their appropriate
ranges.
Policy intervention Number One of Table 2 gives the minimum and
maximum range of the expected amount of the annual percent increase in
energy demand for the year 1985. Policy intervention Number Two indicates
the year when all deregulation of oil and gas would be lifted in the U. S.
In an accelerated program, all regulation would be lifted in 1977 or in a
"business as usual II environment such regulations would remain in effect
until 1985. Intervention Number Three, conservation, has been previously
described. Policy intervention Number Four indicates the time required
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Table 2: Range of Policy Interventions
Range
Policy Interventions
Minimum Maximum
1 Energy Growth in 1985 1.5% 3.5%
2 Year of Deregulation of Oil and 1977 1985
Gas
3 Conservation of Energy -.15 -.33
4 Nuclear Development (Years to 5 years 10 years
complete conventional nuclear
reactor)
5 Coal Development (Scale of 1 to 1 10
10 with 1 being business as
usual and 10 being maximum
acceleration)
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to plan and const;'uct a conventional nuclear reactor. Presently in the
u. S. that time is nine years. It is conceivable that by streamlining the
planning and construction phase the time requirements could be reduced to
five years with the appropriate federal stimulus.
The coal development program, represented by policy intervention
Number Five, was dealt with in a separate manner. Within COAL 1 there are
six variables that require alteration to effect an accelerated coal program.
They include such variables as. the fraction of energy demanded for direct
coal use in industry. a price support program guaranteeing a minimum rate
of return on investment for the coal industry, a guaranteed loan program
for the coal industry, etc. A scalar system from one to ten was used to
translate the six variables of COAL 1 into an overall choice of emphasis
(see Figure 10). A selection of one indicates a non-accelerated coal
program, whereas ten indicates a heavy emphasis on an accelerated coal
program in the U. S.
A set of 24 Policy Intervention Packages (PIPs) representing a
wide range of the conceivable policy interventions for the U. S. system
were then developed and applied to COAL 1, as indicated in Table 3. These
24 PIPs were created by selecting random values within the minimum-
maximum ranges for each of the five types of policy intervention. The
specific values on each intervention were then translated into the input
requirements of COAL 1. As mentioned earlier, a series of computer pro-
grams were developed for this purpose. Figure 11 demonstrates the trans-
lation of the values of the Policy Intervention Package Number Nineteen
into the required 63 values necessary for COAL 1 for that particular PIP.
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Fractional Range of Energy Demanded Example Input if
as COAL by Industry Scalar Value of
Year 6 selected
Minimum Maximum
1950 .350 .350 .350
1960 .150 .150 .150
1970 .097 .097 .097
1980 .067 .098 .084
1990 .055 .100 .080
2000 .048 .110 .082
2010 .043 .120 .086
Figure 10. Translation of coal program emphasis (1 to 10
scalar system) into one example variable, FEDeT, of the
Coa1 1 ｴｾｯ､･ 1.
Table 3. Policy Intervention Packages (PIPs)
Case Energy Deregulation Techn. Nuclear Coal
Number Growth of oil/gas Fix Deve1op- Deve1op-
at 1985 controls (Conservation) ment ment
2.3 1978 .25 8 9
2 1.7 1982 .25 8 7
3 2.3 1979 .18 7 2
4 2.5 1977 .32 7 5
5 2.2 1977 · 17 6 2 I
W
-I'>
6 2.4 1984 .20 5 4
7 2.2 1977 · 17 7 5
8 1.6 1981 .30 8 6
24 2.9 1981 · 16 7 10
PIP
Energy growth
at 1985 2.9%
Oeregt.
of oil/gas
controls 1977
GNPGRT
DEREGT
CASE 19
VARIABLE
3.5
1977
3.5 1.4
Nuclear
Develop. yrs
completion 9 yrs
Techn.
Fix
(Conserv. ) -.20
slope.. I
OMP 2T
NC 2T
1.4
9
1.0 . .631
w
(.11
Coal
development 10 FEDCT 3.5 O. 15 ......... .120
FIASS 2T .0 .178 ........ 1.000
SO 2EFT 6.1 6.1 .......... .756
FFCCRT .065 .082 ........ .083
FeRI 2T .000 .030 ........ .339
CPRAT 2T 1.267 1.268 ........ 2.000
Figure 11. Translation of Policy Intervention Paskage 19 into Values
Necessary for COAL 1.
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ｬｴ･ｾ 1· Use the External Model to Determi ne the Subsequent
on itions ReSUTti n9 from Each of the Pol icy Intervent ion
Packages
The final step for the external-systems analyst is to run the
computer model of the external system for each of the Policy Intervention
Packages (PIPs). The results of step 2 provide descriptions of each policy
intervention in terms of the parameters of the model of the system. These
values serve as input to the model. In the present exercise t the 24 PIPs
were used to generate 24 Subsequent Conditions Packages (SCPs). The
subsequent conditions resulting from Case 19 are shown in Table 4.
In summarYt the responsibility of the external-systems analyst is
to carry out the following steps:
1. Develop a model of the external system; the model quantifies
and thus externalizes the relations between policy interventions and subse-
quent conditions produced by the interventions.
2. Assist in determining what interventions can be employed in
changing the system.
3. Assist in providing the appropriate ranges of the selected
policy interventions and subsequent conditions.
4. Translate the Policy Intervention Package (PIP) into appro-
priate input variables necessary for model runs.
5. Translate the output data into appropriate SCPs.
The Pol icy Consultant's Task
The policy consultant1s task has four major components. First t
the pol icy consultant rnus t ana lyti ca11y integrate the i nformati on provi ded
by both types of systems analystst otherwise the pol icy maker will very
Table 4. Subsequent Conditions that result from applying
COAL 1 to Policy Intervention Package 19.*
Sontinen- Syn-
Gross tal thetic Coal Nuclear
Energy Net Oil/Gas Oil/Gas Oil/Gas Electric Electric Average
Consump- Energy Prod. Prod. Oil/Gas Electric Gener- Gener- Coal Energy
Time tion Demand Rate Rate Import Generation ation ation Demand Price
1950. 34,3b 29,'J8 18,320 ,000 ,851 ,281 ,51.15 ,000 14,21 ,1822 w
-...J
- 1955, 40,34 34,'8 23,54& ,000 2,tJ25 .411 ,819 ,000 t:5 .10 ,8271
19 &0, 41,41 40,95 28,968 ,000 5,418 ,&29 1,2&8 ,000 11,4.5 ,8702
19&5, 51,40 48,03 35,645 .0021 5.982 ,919 1,949 ,001 13.10 ,9211
197 0, &9,1 9 5&,13 43,866 ,000 1,013 1,722 2,608 ,0S2 15,56 ,9740
t'HiS, 83,37 &5.24 42,144 ,000 18,945 3.299 3,24Q ,345 18.22 1.462Q
198O, ｾ Ｇ Ｕ Ｌ Ｐ Ｘ 71,&6 33,906 ,000 33,726 4.973 3,631 l.i48 20,17 2,5549
19 8'5, Ｑ Ｐ ｱ Ｎ ｾ Ｓ 77,17 3'1,025 ,213 ]Q,I&7 5.23& 5,7&3 3,046 21,84 3,3499
l QQ 0, 12b. en 63,11 39,039 3.513 23,258 ".312 9,0215 5.3&1 Q3,88 4,O771
lQQ5, lSh.20 90.0& 39,9321 11 ,222 4,'H)] 3,5t. 13,4&2 8.:U6 81,13 4,&394
200O, 18 A ,60 191,1& 26,175 3&.796 ,000 4,447 1&.64q \\,0221 125, en 4.459b
20l?15. 2 'l ｾ , &0 t05,15 11,047 51,592 ,000 8,25f1 16.'735 14,525 1&O,39 5,45(,3
20H'1, ?S'S,I 45 t HI. 30 12,750 &b,7'9 .000' 12,6&8 18,163 18,790 17Q,7& 6,3111
*All values of columns 2-10 given in Quads of BTU's and column
11 is in U.S. $ per btu given in values of 10- 5 •
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likely set both types of information aside in favor of the results of
older, more familiar, and less effective intuitive procedures. In addition,
the 'integrated information must be displayed in a form that is pol icy-
relevant, otherwise it is not l'ikely to be used, or, if used, l"ikely to be
mis-used. Moreover, the policy maker should be able to interact dynamically
with the (internal) model of his judgment policies and with the model of
the external system in order to pursue IIwhat if. .. 11 questions. What steps
should the policy consultant take to achieve these aims?
Step 1. Establish the Link Between Intervention and
Subsequent Conditi ons pQTl ci es
It will be recalled that in Step 4 of the internal-systems analyst's
task a sample of SCPs and PIPs was randomly generated in order to provide
a set of SCPs and PIPs to be judged by the pol icy maker. The sample of
PIPs also provides a variety of inputs for running the external model a
large number of times. In this way a large set of inputs and the outputs
associated with them are obtained by virtue of the functional relations
within the model. That is, (a) a number (N) of PIPs (each PIP consisting
of different discrete values on several dimensions) are applied to the
external model, (b) the model is run N times (once for each PIP), thus (c)
producing N PIPs (inputs) and associated SCPs (outputs).
The reader will recognize this sort of information as being of the
same kind as that usually produced by the external-systems analyst, with
the exception that the external model is ordinarily run only a few times,
thus allowing the observer to discover the relations between a few ｳｰ･｣ｩｦｩｾ
policy interventions and specific subsequent conditions produced by the
model. The information produced by this conventional procedure is limited
and incomplete, however, for it does not locate these specific interventions
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and outcomes in the context of the policy maker's general policy--for the
simple reason that the conventional procedure does not include the con-
struction of an internal model of the policy maker's judgment policy.
In the present example, models of three policy maker's judgment
policies concerning intervention (see Figure 5 above) and models of their
judgment policies for subsequent conditions (see Figure 6 above) were con-
structed. As a result, it was possible for the policy consultant to apply
these judgment policies to the input conditions and output data of several
runs of the Naill COAL 1 model.
The Naill model was run 24 times using as inputs the 24 PIPs which
represented a wide sample of conceivable U. S. energy policy interventions.
Each PIP, with its set of discrete values on each dimension provides ·the
x values in the policy equation.
J = wlxl + w2x2 + ... wnxn
Since the weights (and function forms) for this equation have already been
obtained for each policy maker, each set of x values provided by each PIP
produces different values of J for each PIP. Calculation of these JI S
thus produces a prediction of the policy maker's preference judgment. The
J values thus make it possible to rank each of the 24 PIPs in terms of the
policy maker's preference. The same procedure is carried out for the
judgment of SCPs, thus also making it possible to order the SCPs in terms
of the policy maker's preference judgments.
The above steps provide the basis of linking the information pro-
duced by internal models (i.e., models of judgment policy regarding inter-
ventions and subsequent conditions) with external models (in this case,
a model of the U. S. energy system).
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To summal ize: N runs of the external model provide an empirical
data base to which internal models of intervention policies and subsequent
conditions policies can be applied. When the internal (cognitive) model is
of the form J = wlxl + w2x2 + ... wnxn (or similar), the wls are the weights
calculated from the policy maker's judgment of N cases and the XiS are the
numeri ca 1 va 1ues of the inputs (and outputs) of N runs of the externa1
model. Calculation of these Js thus produces a predicted judgment for
each of the N runs of the external model; these calculations permit the
construction of Forecasting Tables, to be described below. The Forecasting
Tables are, therefore, a product of the analytical linkage of value judg-
ments of the policy maker (represented by the interlidl model) with facts
(represented by the external model).
Stee £. Construct Forecasting Tables for ｾ ｡ ｣ ｨ
POllCY Maker
The policy consultant constructs a Forecasting Table (see Figure 12)
for each policy maker so that he will be able to see the results of the
analytical linkage of PIPs and SCPs. In this way, the policy maker will
be able to see which PIP leads to which SCPo Forecasting Tables not only
enable the policy maker to see the preference rank of any PIP and the
preference rank of the SCP it produces. but, in addition, any SCP can be
traced back to the preference rank of the PIP that produced it. In short,
the Forecasting Tables make it possible for the policy maker not only to
work forward from the present to the future but also to work backward from
the future to the present.
Consider working forward in Forecasting Table 1 (Figure 12). Obser-
vation of Forecasting Table 1 provides the policy maker Jl with two vital
RANK PIP J1 CASE
ｏｕｔｃｏｾＱｅ J 1 CASE
OUTCOME J11985 2000
1 16 15.40 19 18. 14 9 17.71
2 ＲＲｾ 15.76 10 ｾ 18.11--19 15. 19
3 2 13.81 . 24 __ 13.58 10 14.66
4 21 12. 17 9 ｾＭＭＭＮ｟ｾ 13 . 31 24 13.14
5 6 11.95 ｾ 1 12.73 15 12.64
6 18 11 .92 7 12.36 13 12.31
7 20 ｾＱＱＮＵＵ 15 12.18 22 11 .85
8 9 11.45 13 11.64 ｾ Ｑ Ｖ 11 .71
9 15 ＱＱＮＴＰｾＱＴ 11 .40 8 11 .4610 4 11 .25 18 10.77 18 11.08
11 12 11.15 8 10.67 7 10.85
12 11 10.83 22 10.14 1 10.71
13 17 10.66 5 9.96 14 9.83
14 8 10.11 16 9.61 17 9.10
15 1 9.48 23 9.58 4 9.02
16 13 9.02 4 9.28 12 8.42 +:0
17 24 8.90 17 9.05 2 8. 17
18 10 8.75 3 8.77 11 7.82
19 3 8.37 6 8.72 5 7.81
20 19 8.13 11 8.45 6 7.70
21 14 5.98 12 8.16 23 7.65
22 7 4.24 21 8.14 3 7.22
23 5 3.73 2 7.86 20 5.71
24 23 2.45 20 5.96 21 4.48
Figure 12. Forecasting Table 1 (Jl)
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pieces of informution; he will learn that his most desirable (rank number 1)
intervention (PIP No. 16) results in subsequent conditions (SCP) in 1985
which are far from the conditions he is trying to achieve; indeed, he will
see that his most desirable policy intervention (PIP No. 16, rank No.1)
will produce a set of outcomes ranked 14th in the list of 24 in 1985. Jl
will ｡ ｬ ｾ ｯ see, however, that the rank of this SCP in 1985 will improve
slightly by the year 2000, reaching a rank of 8.
Now consider working backward from the year 2000. Jl can see that
in order to achieve the conditions he finds most desirable for the year
2000 (SCP No.9), he will have to accept a condition ranked 4th for 1985;
and in order to achieve both these conditions he will ｨ ｡ ｶ ｾ to intervene
with a PIP ranked 8th in oesirability in the list of 24.
Consider the situation confronting J2. The information presented
in Forecasting Table 2 (Figure 13) tells J2 immediately that if he acts on
the basis of his most desirable intervention, the subsequent conditions
produced by it would be disastrous. But J2 can also quickly see that he
can achieve very desirable outcomes for the years 1985 and 2000 by
accepting an intervention policy ranked 6th; not a highly unpalatable set
of circumstances.
Now consider "President Carter1s" Forecasting Table (Figure 14).
The moderate discrepancies indicated there suggest that "Carter" is faced
with palatable choices. Note "Carter's" PIP No.1; it is his 3rd ranking
PIP and results in his 2nd ranking SCP for 1985 and his 3rd ranking SCP
for the year 2000, a situation any policy maker would find comforting.
In short, the information displayed by the policy consultant in
Forecasting Tables of this form is directly, succinctly and graphically
CASE POLICY J 2 CASE
OUTCOME J 2 CASE
ｏｕｔｃｏｾＱｅ J 2NOW 1985 2000
l. 21 16.38 19 17 .91 23 18.14
2. 22"" 15.67 ____ 23 .....--=:::f 17.15 7 15.75
3. 9 15.48 4 15.89 17 15.63
4. ＱＳｾＱＵＮＹＴ W 15.50 20 15.55
5. 19 15.60 11 15.14 3 15.53
6. 23 " 13.01 1 15. 11 12 15.327. 2 12.08 7 14.41 4 15.24
8.
9.
10.
1l.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
"
. . . .p.
17. w
18.
19. . ｾ 1620. 6 4.89 5.24 24 13.61
2l. 5 4.55 21 _ 5.20 18 13 .41
22. 17 4.49 17 4.67 10 13.10
23. 20 4.38 15 - ＴＮＱＳｾ 15 20.09
24. 14 3.53 6 3.93 .... 21 3.45
Figure 13. Forecasting Table 2 (J2)
CASE POLICY J CASE 1985 J CASE 2000 J(CARTER) (CARTER) (CARTER)
1 . 2 15. 32 ｾ 10 -=::::::=I 12.32 10 12.08
2. 22 14.63 1 11 .99 18 12.08
3. 1 13.43 24 11 .92 1 11 .88
4. 18 ..-/13.20 4 11 .66 24 11 .45
5. 16 12.85 19 11 .60 22 11 .39
6.
7. ,.-;/'
. '-;
8. - ｾ - .
9. 10 11 .00 .ｾｾ 2 10. 76-£=:=-2 11.11
10.
1l.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16. -Po
17.
-Po
18.
19.
20.
2l. 21 6.76 13 8.44 5 8.38
22. 23 6.53 6 8.05 23 8.17
23. 3 6.51 15 7.15 3 8.15
24. 5 5.52 21 7.05 21 7.01
Figure 14. "President Carter's" Forecasting Table
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policy-relevant; it tells the policy maker what he needs to know. This
information can be produced only by a) an internal-systems analyst who
provides a model of the policy maker's judgment system, b) an external-
systems analyst who provides a model of the socio-physical system under
study, and c) a policy consultant who links analytically the inforrnation
provided by both systems analysts.
Forecasting Tables can provide other information of value to the
policy makers and the policy consultants, a matter to which we now turn.
Further Information Provided ｾ Forecasting ｔ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ
(Caution: In this section we shall deliberately ｾ Ｍ ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ｰ ｲ ･ ｴ
the hypothetical data in the Forecasting Tables for the purpose of explaining
the uses to which they may be put.)
Forecasting Tables provide two sorts of further information: a)
information within a table regarding one policy maker, and (b) information
derived from comparing tables regarding two (or more) policy makers. A
table for one policy maker ind'lcates (a) the range of the values of judg-
ment (e.g., from 2.45 to 15.40 in col. 3 in the Forecasting Table for Jl)
in contrast with a larger or smaller range that might have been obtained,
(b) the size of the difference between ranked cases (18.14 - 18.11 in col.
5 in contrast with 17.71 - 15.19 in col. 7), and (c) the degree of corre-
lation between ratings of PIPs and SCPs. Note that a low correlation
between ratings of PIPs and SCPs suggests (but does not prove) a lack of
lIintuitive wisdom ll on the part of the policy maker. A low correlation also
carries a warning that one or the other model (or both) is apt to be con-
sidered wrong, and thus not likely to be trusted by the policy maker.
Not shown here are d) the results of an application of ｾ sensitivity
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analysis (e.g., assuming equal weights on all variables, and/or changing
the ranges on certain variables). Sensitivity analyses are of considerable
value, for they indicate the extent to which it is important to discrimi-
nate between various PIPs and SCPs.
Information that can be gained from comparing data between policy
makers ｾｮ｣ｬｵ､･ｳ (a) the degree of conflict between policy makers (e.g.,
as may be obtained from calculating the correlation between the PIPs and/or
SCPs for Jl and J2, thus indicating whether conflict exists between policy
makers Itli th regard to means or ends or both; and (b) the absol ute degree
of desirability of the most desirable cases. Also (c) the effects of ｾ
sensitivity analysis between policy makers can be ascertained; what may
appear to be a large difference in judgment between policy makers may be
highly sensitive to changes in conditions and/or assumptions, and thus be
a highly context-dependent difference which can be readily eliminated or
reduced.
Although both types of systems analysts will be aware of the
uncertainty in both models and will note that such uncertainty is not
reflected in the Forecasting Tables, the policy makers will ordinarily
not be. Examination of the effects of uncertainty on judgment policies
and external simulations can be a sobering experience for policy makers
who are prepared to fight to the bitter end for a difference that may
turn out to be subject to irreducible uncertainty and thus elusive in
fact, however critical it may be in principle. Moreover, examination of
the effects of uncertainty can also be a sobering experience for substan-
tive scientists who contribute information and judgments to the develop-
ment of external models. None of these questions can be addressed unless
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external and internal models are employed, nor can they be addressed properly
unless a complete methodology is employed that links analytically both
external and internal models.
Step 1. Displaying Information
The pol icy consul tant cannot s imply present the pol icy maker wi th
Forecasting Tables that indicate the link between present policies and
their future consequences (as in the examples presented here), and then
simply leave it to the policy maker to "make up his mind" about what he
should do. For even though Forecasting Tables provide the policy maker
with a fonn of cognitive assistance he can get from no other source, there
is a considerable amount of complex information in such tables and, there-
fane, they may not be used appropriately or effectively by the policy
maker. And because the amount of information is too large to be safely
trusted to human information processing, the form in which the information
is displayed may itself bias policy choices. Indeed, whenever information
is larga in amount and/or complex in its meaning, the ferm of its presen-
tation is apt to have a covert effect on policy choices.
Although the form of the present Forecasting Tables serves the
purpose of indicating the links between intervention and subsequent condi-
tions, this display may bias the judgment of the policy maker with regard
to ultimate choice of actions for it strongly suggests that a horizontal
line, set as high as possible across the columns in the tables (that is,
a line that maximized the ranks of PIPs and SCPs across columns) would
provide the best policy for both the present and the future. But the
selection of a horizontal line would nesult in a policy of giving equal
weight to the present and the future, a fact not likely to be appanent to
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the policy maker, and a policy that might not represent the policy maker's
intentions. Such situations illustrate the need for the policy consultant;
it is the policy consultant's responsibility to see to it that the policy
maker does not become a victim of the form of the display of information,
as well as other psychological factors, when forming policy (see [13J, for
a further discussion of this point).
Step i. The Policy Maker's Interaction with Information
Provided Ql Internal and External Models
The policy maker should be able to ask "what if.. II questions
with regard to the information provided by both models. What if the tech-
nical data are biased in one direction or another? What if I changed my
general policy regarding interventions and give more weight to this inter-
vention and less to that one? These questions can be answered by straight-
forward quantitative adjustments, and these can be carried out by the
policy consultant with instructive results. (See [lOJ for an example.)
There is a larger "what if... " question, hl."r'Jever, and that con-
cerns the trade-off between the present and the future. In addition to the
above interactions with the models, the policy consultant should provide
an opportunity for the policy maker to place different weights on the
present and the future. Differential weights on the importance of the
present and the future lie at the core of the problem of the use of the
earth's resources, including sources of energy. Moreover, placing differ-
ential weights on the present and the future is an activity that interacts
with democratic control over resources. In the case of energy demand, for
example, a president or prime minister might wish to establ ish or preserve
his popularity by implementing the PIP that his present constituents
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consider most desirable, leaving the undesirable SCPs to be dealt with by
his successor·s. (Such an energy policy has been caricatured by a columnist
as "we found our on, 1et the ki ds find thei rs! ") . On the other hand, a
political leader might be so concerned about the welfare of future genera-
tions that he would place considerable weight on achieving desirable condi-
tions in the year 2000 at the cost of maintaining his present popularity
("Ild rather be right than be president! ") [14J.
It will seldom, if ever, be the case that the trade-off between
the present and the future can be avoided, since the policy maker's most
desirable PIP will seldom, if ever, result in the most desirable SCPo
When faced with the situation in which an unpalatable present must be
accepted if a palatable future is to be achieved (or vice versa), policy
makers will attempt to strike a balance between the desirability of a given
intervention and the desirability of a given future. The question then
becomes: how much unpalatability is to be accepted now, and how much
unpalatability then? How much convenience that could be enjoyed by those
living in the present should be sacrificed for the convenience of those
who will live in the future?
Societies vary, of course, in the extent to which they make clear
their compromises between present and future convenience. But in no
society can the link between present policies and subsequent outcomes be
traced, because conventional techniques do not provide the information
offered by the Forecasting Tables indicated above, nor do they provide
safeguards against psychological factors that lead to inappropriate use
of large amounts of complex and often uncertain information. As a result,
planning often fails because it is largely intuitive. It is the policy
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consultant's ｴ ｡ ｳ ｾ to remedy this situation. How should he proceed once
such Forecasting Tables are made available?
Applying !he Technigues_ of Internal-Systems ａ ｮ ｾ ｬ ｙ ｳ ｩ ｳ to
the Trade-Off Between the Present and the Future
Trading off the present for the future is a task that requires
judgment; therefore the techniques of internal-systems analysis should be
applied to this problem. The simplest way for the policy consultant to
proceed is by asking the policy maker to indicate how much weight he would
place on the present in relation to the future--when the present is defined
in terms of his intervention policy, and the future is defined in tern5
of his subsequent conditions pol icy. "Weight" can be expr2ssed by the policy
maker by dividing 100 points between the present and the future. This
simple step results in expressions of the following kind:
J = Wp (present) + Wf (future)
Equal weight would result in J = .5 (present) + .5 (future). When the
future is considered to be twice as important as the present, then of
course, J = .33 (present) + .66 (future). In short, a weighted sum of
the present and the future can be applied to the appropriate columns of
the Forecasting Tables indicated above. Various weightings can be used
together with a sensitivity analysis in order to discover how large a
difference in weights is required to produce a meaningful difference in
policy choice.
As an example of the use of such weights, suppose the policy maker
places a weight of 0.75 on the present and 0.25 on the future. Now apply
those weights to a PIP with a desirahility rating of 18 and an associated
SCP with a rating of 14. The weighting formula would give us:
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J = (0.75 x 18) + (0.25 x 14) = 17.
Judgments such as these, representing the desired compromise policy of the
policy maker, can be calculated for each PIP and its associated SCPo If
the compromise ratings are then ranked, the combination ranked first
constitutes the present Policy Intervention Package and Subsequent Condi-
ti onS Package that best represent the compromi se between the present and
the future desired by the policy maker.
Applying weights to the ratings of PIPs and SCPs gives us the best
compromise between the policy maker1s concern for the present and future
for the specific PIP and SCP combinations considered. As indicated above,
however, it is essential to know how the policy maker's original policy
regarding the present has to be modified in order to accommodate the neces-
sary compromise between present and future as well as knowing how the
policy maker's original policy for the future must be modified; it is not
sufficient to deal with specific PIPs and SCPs. For unless the policy
changes are shown to the policy maker, there is risk that a compromise
action wiil be taken without consideration of its implications for, and
changes required in, the original overall policies regarding the present
and the future. In short, the policy maker will have lost track of what
he is doing. It is the function of the policy consultant to provide the
requisite cognitive assistance to prevent that circumstance.
In order to provide this assistance the following procedure can
be followed. Recall that each PIP and SCP combination now has a compromise
rating associated with it as a result of applying weights to the present
and the future. These new ratings are, of course, different from the
policy maker's original ratings of PIPs and SCPs because they have been
changed to take account of the weighting of the present and the future.
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Therefore, the original profiles that were used to evoke the policy maker's
original judgments (see Figure 2) now have a new (compromise) judgment
associated with them. When these compromise judgments are applied to the
original profiles, a new analysis of the parameters (weights, function
forms, etc.) of the judgment pol icy is ca rri ed out. These wei ghts and
function forms (for both the present and the future) are then shown to
the policy maker for his evaluations.
The results of applying this procedure to IIPresident Carter'sll
policies can be seen in Figures 15 and 16. The compromise ratings used in
the judgment analysis were based upon weights of .4 and .6 on the present
and the future, respectively. The policy weights shown iii Figure 15 should
be compared to those shown in rigure 5, which contains IIPresident Carter's"
specified policy for the present. This comparison shows that "President
Carter" will have to put more emphasis on coal development in the future
than his original policy indicated if his desired compromise between
present and future is to be achieved. The comparison also shows why
"President Carter" cannot implement either his ideal policy for the present
nor his ideal policy for the future.
Such information is precisely the information President Carter and
ether policy makers ( as well as their constituents) must have if they are
to integrate their social values with scientific information. No procedure,
other than that described here will provide that information, and that
information is the core of intelligent policy formation in a world of
uncertain interdependencies among critical conditions.
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RELATIVE WEIGHT PROFILE
A:Carter--2000 Compromise
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
Energy Growth
AAAAA
Dereg. oil & Gas (Year)
AAA
Conservation
AAAAAA
Nuclear Development
A
Coal Development
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0.0------------------0.5------------------1.0
WEIGHT
0.13
0.09
0.15
0.05
IL58
FUNCT ｆｏｒｾｉ
NEGLIN
NEGLIN
POSLIN
NEGLIN
POSLIN
Figure 15. The Intervention Policy "President Carter ll should follow if his
policy for compromising between present interventions and future conditions
(in 2000) is to be achieved.
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* A
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FUNCTION FORM PROFILE
ａ Ｚ ｃ ｡ ｾ ｴ ･ ｲ Ｍ Ｍ Ｒ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ Compromise:MIN =
C*A *A
a* AA * AA
r* A * A
t* AA *
e* A *
r* AA *
-* A *
-* AA *
2* A *
0* AA *
0* A *
0* AA *
* A *
*******************
4.362
AA
A
AA
A
AA
A
AA
A
AA
A
*
*
*
12.25
A
AA
1.6 3.5
Energy Growth
1976.0 1984.0
Dereg. Oil & Gas-Year
15.0 32.0
Conservation
C*A * A
a* AA * AA
r* A * A
t* AA * AA
e* A * A
r* AA * AA
-* A * A
-* l'\A * AA
;:* A * A
0* AA * AA
0* A * A
0* AA * Af.,
* A *A.
******************* *******************
5.0 10.0 1.0 HI.0
ｴ ｉ ｵ ｜ Ｎ Ｎ Ｚ ｬ ･ ｡ ｾ Development Coal Development
Figure 16. Functional relationships for "President Carter1s" policy that
would yield a compromise between desirable interventions and desirable
subsequent conditions.
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Appendix
INTERNATIONAL LINKAGE OF INTERNAL MODELS AND EXTERNAL
MODELS VIA COMPUTER INTERCONNECTIONS
. In the present example several computers at different locations
were interconnected in order to link a model of the judgment process with
a model of an environmental process. This procedure, as it stands now,
will permit several policy makers in various parts of the world to inter-
act with one another and/or with a computer model and/or data banks stored
in various locations.
The interconnections that were used in the present study are
broadly depicted below (they are shown. in greater detail in Figure 17).
POLICY 3 Policy Integration COAL 1 Model
G. E. MARK I II PDP-ll I IBM 370
"
ｾ ｾｉ［
Timesharing System II ViennaIIASA ｾWorl dwi de Laxenburg itI·
II
II
The first set of programs, developed to operate on IIASA's PDP-ll,
were those necessary to generate the required input for the COAL 1 model.
These programs, which were described above, generated a matrix of 50 rows
by 63 columns of input values for the COAL 1 model. The COAL 1 model was
run on an IBM 370 model 55 computer located in Vienna. The COAL 1 model
was operated via a timesharing terminal at IIASA.
The PDP-1l was then programmed to act as a computer terminal to
receive the output of COAL 1 from the Vienna computer system. The output
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Figure 17. Diagram of International Computer Network System Developed at IIASA
* Note: Sequence of activity is indicated in the various circles
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was transferred to the PDP-ll in order to simplify subsequent manipulations
of the data and to allow for transfer of the data to other computer systems.
A program was developed to select the data required by the judgment model.
These data were transferred to the General Electric MARK IIrB)international
timesharing computer system, which has computers located in the United
States and Europe and access points in some 24 countries. The PDP-ll was
again programmed to act as a terminal and the data were transferred via the
local MARK III access point in Vienna.
The judgment model, POLICY 3, is available on the MARK III system,
and can, therefore, be accessed both from the United States and Austria.
The data from COAL 1 were the input to the judgment model. The ｡ｮ｡ｬｹｳ･ｾ
required for the judgment model were perfonned in Boulder, Colondo, using
POLICY 3 and an interactive statistical package available on the MARK III
system. The results of these analyses could then be accessed directly via
the ternrlnals available at IIASA.
It should be emphasized that all of the software developed was of
a general purpose nature and allows for the ease of automatic transfer of
data from one computer system to another. This set of software remains in
the possession of IIASA for future ar.tivity.
The above described international computer interconnections were
developed in the present fonn for several reasons: First, the interconnec-
tions were required in order for us to complete our work. Resources neces-
sary for our work were located at IIASA, Vienna, and in the U.S.A. Conse-
quently, a link between the various resources was required. Second, the
various programs developed to provide automatic transfer of data from one
system to another were constructed so that they could be used in the future
with ease. Third, the interconnections provide an opportunity for IIASA to
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expand the communication resources of its scientists and their potential
interaction with international policy makers. Policy makers need not be
located in the U. S. in order to use the above system; they may reside in
any of the 24 countries that now use the GE network. It is now possible
to link up the IIASA terrilinals with other networks) or to use a telephone
entry and thus link up with ｾ ｬ ｯ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｷ Ｉ Warsaw and other countries in the
East. Although the COAL 1 model was stored on the IBM Computer in Vienna)
we could) of course) have addressed other models on other computers else-
vJhere.
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